Critical Review of DPWH Handling: San Juanico Bridge and Region 8 Infrastructure

The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) recently held a press briefing addressing the temporary closure and structural concerns of the iconic San Juanico Bridge—a vital infrastructure linking Leyte and Samar that has stood for over 50 years. In the briefing, DPWH Secretary Manuel Bonoan detailed ongoing retrofitting measures, future plans for a second bridge, and interim arrangements for public mobility. This article critically examines the DPWH’s infrastructure management practices, using the secretary’s statements as a primary reference. It also evaluates the broader implications for Region 8, where recurring failures in design, maintenance, and long-term planning—such as in the cases of Biliran Bridge and deteriorating Samar roads—raise serious concerns about the agency’s foresight, accountability, and resilience planning for critical national infrastructure.

I. Failure in Strategic Asset Management

  • Aging Infrastructure with No Redundancy: The San Juanico Bridge, a 50-year-old structure, is a single-point failure infrastructure. With no alternate land route, its failure or restriction severely disrupts mobility and economy. This lack of redundancy highlights poor strategic foresight in DPWH planning.

  • Delayed Replacement Planning: It is troubling that plans for a second bridge only started decades after structural concerns were expected. A responsible asset management system should trigger long-term replacement planning when a bridge reaches its 30th year.

  • Reactive Maintenance Culture: Secretary Bunoan confirmed that the deterioration of the approach structure was only recently discovered. This suggests a deficient monitoring system for structural health despite its economic importance.

Why is it only now that serious rehabilitation and load restrictions are happening, when the risk has existed for years?

II. Weak Operational Response and Emergency Planning

  • No Temporary Bridge: Despite public concern, DPWH ruled out a temporary bridge due to time constraints. This exposes the lack of pre-emptive emergency infrastructure plans, which should exist for vital national routes.

  • Inadequate Contingency Logistics: The shuttle system is only for passengers and is dependent on local/private collaboration. There is no systematized, government-led emergency logistics plan for cargo, risking prolonged disruption.

III. Issues in the Project Development Cycle

  • The DPWH Infrastructure Development Cycle, while logical on paper, is not resilient in practice. Issues include:

    • Poor prioritization: Even critical national infrastructure like San Juanico was not flagged early enough for immediate action.

    • Excessive delays: The second bridge is only in feasibility stage; final construction might begin around 2027, four years after closure started.

    • No embedded condition-based asset monitoring: There’s no mention of advanced structural monitoring in operational evaluation, which is a global best practice.

IV. Questionable Regional Infrastructure Performance

  • Region 8 appears to suffer from chronic infrastructure planning and execution issues:

    • Poor road durability, slow rehabilitation, and design flaws are evident in Samar roads.

    • Biliran Bridge failure and San Juanico Bridge deterioration reflect recurring problems in design and maintenance oversight.

    • There seems to be weak enforcement of engineering accountability and insufficient use of asset performance data.

V. Secretary Bunoan’s Briefing: Strengths and Weaknesses

Aspect

Evaluation

Technical Clarity

− Gave vague answers (e.g., no budget estimate until DED is done; no timeline for complete rehab of old bridge).

Risk Communication

+ Safety is rightly prioritized. − However, economic impact minimization was treated as secondary.

Planning Weakness

− Admission that retrofitting now is just a response to the unexpected finding shows a reactive culture.

Contingency Measures

− Limited shuttle system and no budget for relief efforts suggests low preparedness for large-scale disruptions.


VI. Recommendations for Reform and Oversight

  1. Mandate 30-Year Structural Reassessment for all national bridges, with replacement/duplication feasibility studies starting by then.

  2. Institutionalize Redundancy Planning in all strategic national infrastructure (especially island linkages).

  3. Establish Bridge Asset Monitoring Systems using smart sensors and AI-enabled inspections to monitor deflection, cracks, corrosion, etc.

  4. Reform Regional DPWH Capacity: Strengthen Region 8’s planning, QA, and engineering capabilities. Provide external technical audits of major infrastructure.

  5. Institutionalize Emergency Logistics Protocols for vital facilities, including temporary bridges and modular ferry systems.

VII. Is Region 8 DPWH Weak?

Region 8 suffers not from incompetence alone, but from being a reflection of a national problem—DPWH’s delayed and reactive culture in infrastructure planning and asset management. However, the visible impact in Samar and Biliran, where logistics are critical for economic lifelines, makes these flaws more damaging and apparent.

The San Juanico Bridge case is not just a technical issue—it is a wake-up call on the need to professionalize, modernize, and anticipate in public infrastructure governance. With economic costs estimated at ₱600 million monthly, this is a failure we cannot afford to repeat.